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Abstract. This paper tests the relationship between time preferences and crime rates as 
posited by Davis (1988), whose theoretical analysis suggests that individuals’ attitude 
towards the future significantly affects their propensity to commit crime. Our empirical 
analysis is based on a panel of Italian regions from 2003 to 2007. Various proxies for time 
preferences are considered: the consumer credit share out of the total amount of loans to 
households, the share of obese individuals out of the total population, the rate of marriages 
out of the total population, and the teenage pregnancy rate. Controlling for a great number 
of factors suggested by the scientific literature on the determinants of crime, adding to the 
model also time and regional fixed effects, and clustering standard errors to account for both 
serial and panel correlations, our results basically provide support to the ‘Davis’ hypothesis’ 
for property crimes, while for violent crimes there seems to be less evidence that these are 
higher where people discount the future more heavily. Moreover, there is no evidence of a 
reverse effect from crime to time preferences at this aggregate level. 
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1. Introduction 
The Ant and the Grasshopper - an Aesopian fable which became very 
popular just before the French Revolution - remarks the misfortune 
accruing to the grasshopper from imprudence, having it spent the warm 
months of the year singing away instead of storing up foods for the incoming 
winter. The allegory was used to give a bright description of the bourgeois 
virtues of hard working and saving, those virtues that the rising class - 
which would have soon taken the power - tried to attribute exclusively to 
itself. The bourgeois was depicted as l’honnête homme who grounds his 
success on both personal effort and the awareness that much patience is 
needed before the fruits accruing from hard-working and trustworthiness 
can be reaped. 
A long-standing tradition in economics echoes similar arguments.  This 
tradition emphasizes that the socially desirable respect of established 
ethical codes of conduct is possible only in the presence of a proper concern 
for the future. Such a concern, however, has varied significantly over the 
centuries and across cultures. Sociologists and anthropologists have in 
recent times emphasized that the vanishing of the future is actually one of 
the most distinctive features of modern societies: as uncertainty grows, 
individuals act as they were condemned to live an everlasting present (e.g. 
Augé, 2008). 
In the eyes of an economist, the reduced concern for the future shows up 
in the long-term fall in saving rates across countries - a well-established 
feature of modern industrialized societies - but also in the widespread 
tendency of the amount of (short-term) debt to raise beyond what can be 
considered a socially responsible level, as the recent financial crisis has 
dramatically shown. Possibly, even the recent remarkable increase in 
corporate scandals may be ultimately due to a reduced concern for the 
future (coupled with some institutional changes which have considerably 
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affected the pay-off structure faced by managers and entrepreneurs in 
modern economies)1.  
In what follows, we test whether there are grounds to argue that a ‘life-
is-now’-perspective may be detrimental for societies, stimulating 
undesirable activities like delinquency and crime. Davis (1988) was the first 
to identify a theoretical link between crime and time preferences. In his 
words, this link finds an easy explanation in the fact that “the fruits of 
illegal activity…can be savoured before the costs of their acquisition must be 
paid” (Davis, 1988: 383). Hence, ceteris paribus, individuals who discount 
the future more heavily may be more prone to commit crimes.  
The goal of this work is to provide a first empirical test to this 
theoretical prediction considering aggregate crime data on Italian regions 
from 2003 to 2007. As for the proxies for time preferences, we focus on four 
very different measures, all of which aggregate individual choices guided by 
idiosyncratic time preferences: consumer credit, which represents short-
term debt typically used by households to finance their consumption; 
obesity, which is linked to the intake of calories more than it is 
recommended by the consideration of future health; marriage, interpreted 
as an institution denoting the willingness of individuals to engage in stable 
relationships; teenage pregnancy, capturing the impatience of individuals for 
having sexual adult experiences. All these variables show clear trends in 
recent decades. The widespread tendency of both the amount of short-term 
debt and the number of obese people to increase, as well as the reduction in 
the willingness to engage in stable relationships, are common features of 
western industrialized countries, all of which may be (at least partly) 
related to time preferences. 
                                                          
1 Beraldo and Turati (2011) discuss several institutional changes that may have shortened 
the agents’ time horizon. There are reasons to believe, for example, that contracts designed 
to provide professional managers adequate monetary incentives in order to align their 
objectives with those of the firms’ owners may have led managers to maximise short term 
gains instead of long-term profits. 
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Controlling for the factors highlighted by the literature on the 
determinants of crime, adding to the model also time and regional fixed 
effects, and clustering standard error to account for both serial and panel 
correlations, our results basically provide support to the ‘Davis’ hypothesis’ 
for property crimes, while for violent crimes there seems to be less evidence 
- at the aggregate level - that these are higher where people discount the 
future more heavily. Moreover, there is no evidence of a reverse effect from 
crime to time preferences at this aggregate level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
briefly describe the theoretical model due to Davis (1988). In Section 3 we 
illustrate our empirical strategy and our data. Results are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical framework: time discounting and attitude to 
crime 
Following Davis (1988), let us consider an individual contemplating illegal 
activity. If undetected she will get an income U(σ), where σ is the rate at 
which offences are committed. Suppose that the individual sees the future 
as split in two sub-periods: in the first sub-period she enjoys the fruits of 
illegal activity; in the second one she is possibly detected and punished. The 
individual does not know exactly when detection will occur. However, as 
soon as she is detected, a fine F must be paid, and - from then on - only an 
income Y accruing from some legal activity may be earned. Over an infinite 
time horizon, the expected present value of future income, accruing from 
both legal and illegal activity can be expressed as: 
 
            dtetFgtYGtGUV rt

 
0
1  (1) 
 
5 
 
where g(.) is the probability density function of the time of detection, G(.) is 
the cumulative of g(.) and r is the individual discount rate, which 
summarise here the way individuals discount the future.  
Let us now consider the probability of being detected within some small 
interval in the neighbourhood of t, P(.), after having breached the law up to 
t. Assuming that the chances of being detected depend only on the offence 
rate at t and on the level of enforcement E, this can be written as: 
 
   
 tG
tg
E,P


1
  (2) 
 
The individual choice problem is that of maximizing (1) subject to (2). 
This optimal control problem is greatly simplified by the fact that P(σ, E) is 
independent from time. With an infinite time horizon this implies σ to be 
constant, hence (2) can be written as a linear differential equation which 
can be substituted into (1). Integrating yields a reformulation of the 
objective of the agent, which is choosing σ such as to maximize: 
 
     
  r
Y
E,Pr
FE,PYU
E,V 





  (3) 
 
The numerator of the first term on the right-hand side of (3) represents 
the expected gains from crime (e.g., Becker, 1968); the denominator is the 
rate at which these gains are discounted. It is worth noticing that the 
effective discount rate is composed by the agent’s usual time preference plus 
the probability of being detected. Therefore, the rate at which offences are 
committed, σ, determines both the expected income from crime and the rate 
at which such income is discounted. 
The first order condition for a maximum, V(σ,E)/σ = 0, imposes that 
the usual condition of equating marginal costs and benefits must be 
satisfied in order for the choice of σ to be optimal. Some comparative statics 
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then reveals that σ
 
/r>0: that is, agents with higher discount rates will be 
more likely to commit crime, or, in other words, the amount of crime 
committed by different individuals can be explained by their attitudes 
toward the future. This is the theoretical prediction we aim at testing in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
 
3. The empirical strategy 
 
3.1. An aggregate model of regional crime rates 
We test the theoretical prediction briefly presented above by considering 
Italian regional data over the period 2003-2007. Since we use here 
aggregate data starting from an individual choice problem, we need to 
discuss aggregation issues before moving to our empirical analysis (e.g., 
Blundell and Stoker, 2005; Durlauf et al., 2008 and 2010). A standard 
representation of the individual expected utility associated with the choice 
of committing crime, which can be interpreted as a (linear) empirical 
counterpart of Eq. (3) above, is: 
 
  itititltitltitititititit ZXru    (4) 
 
where  = {0, 1} is an indicator for having (1) or not (0) committed crime; r is 
the individual discount rate; X and Z are, respectively, individual (index i) 
and region (index l) specific observable variables emphasized by the 
scientific literature on the determinants of crime;  and ε are individual and 
region specific unobservables; finally, , , and  are (unknown) parameters 
describing preferences. Following Durlauf et al. (2008), we make the 
following assumptions to restrict the nature of unobserved heterogeneity: 
 
A.1.    0)0()1(  ititE   
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A.2.   )0()1( ltlt    is independent of  )0()1( itit    
A.3.   )0()1( itit    is independent of r, X and Z. 
 
The i-th individual will commit crime if and only if [uit(1)-uit(0)] is (strictly) 
positive, which implies: 
 
    0)0()1()0()1(  ititltltltitit ZXr   (5) 
 
or: 
 
   )1()0()0()1( ititltltltitit ZXr    (6) 
 
Eq. (6) makes clear that, conditional on r, X, Z, and  )0()1( ltlt   , individual 
choices are stochastic. Let us denote by Ait the cumulative distribution 
function of  )1()0( itit   ; the probability to commit a crime can then be 
written as: 
 
   )0()1()0()1(,,,|1Pr ltltltitititltltltititit ZXrAZXr    (7) 
 
This (conditional) probability to commit crime at the individual level can 
then be aggregated to obtain the (expected) regional specific crime rate lt: 
 
   
ititit XltltltitltltltXrlt
dFZXrAZFFE   )0()1()0()1(,,,| 
 
(8) 
 
where Fr and FX are the empirical distribution functions in the l-th region of 
the discount rates and the individual controls X. Further assuming that the 
probability density function of  )1()0( itit   : 
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A.4. dAit follows a uniform distribution 
 
we can derive the following linear regression model, which is our estimating 
equation to be tested below: 
 
ltltltltltltlt ZXr   )0()1(  (9) 
 
where ltr  and ltX  are the empirical means of the discount rates and the 
variables in X within the l-th region, and lt  is the difference between 
realized and expected crime rates. 
As for region specific crime rates lt, we consider both (reported) property 
crime and violent crime as measured by the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT). In particular, the property crime rate is the number of 
property crimes (like thefts, robberies, frauds and burglaries) per 1,000 
inhabitants. The violent crime rate is the number of violent crimes (like 
rapes, homicides, kidnappings and injuries) per 10,000 inhabitants. Main 
descriptive statistics for these variables are in the Appendix. Over our five 
years period, the average property crime rate is 22 per 1,000 inhabitants, 
while the violent crime rate is about 16 per 10,000 inhabitants. Both 
variables show a clear increasing trend: from 20 to 23 per 1,000 inhabitants 
for property crimes, and from 11 to 18 per 10,000 inhabitants for violent 
crimes. Both variables also show a clear geographical variability: property 
crimes are 28 per 1,000 people in the North-Western part of the country, 
and drop to 15 per 1,000 in the South; violent crimes are instead 17.8 per 
10,000 inhabitants in the North-West, and 13.8 in North-Eastern regions. 
From table 1, it emerges a positive and statistically significant linear 
correlation between the two types of crime (r = 0.3669; p-value=0.0002). 
Before moving further it is worth noticing that – as the previous 
discussion make clear – we need a number of assumptions for model in Eq. 
(9) to be an adequate representation of the aggregate behaviour of 
9 
 
individuals located in different regions. For instance, as highlighted by 
Durlauf et al. (2008), there is no reason for the orthogonality assumptions to 
hold. Hence, this means that most (if not all) estimated coefficients will be 
biased, and one cannot make a correct causal inference. Moreover, as we 
discuss below, this problem is exacerbated here by the fact that we can 
measure only imprecisely the average discount rate. We do our best to 
account for both unobserved heterogeneity at the regional as well as year 
level considering regional and year fixed effects in all our specifications, and 
to account for serial and panel correlation. However, our estimates below 
must cautiously be interpreted as the search for robust ceteris paribus 
correlations. 
 
 
3.2. Proxying time preferences 
Time preferences are usually measured at the individual level via 
experiments or surveys, proposing individuals a number of alternative 
choices, and asking for preferences of having a (discounted) amount of 
money now or the whole amount some time later in the future (see, e.g., 
recent contributions by Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Meier and Sprenger, 
2011a, b). Varying both the discount rate for computing the present value 
and the time interval, researchers are able to elicit individual time 
preferences, and separate these from risk attitudes. But here we consider 
aggregate crime data, and the main challenge for our analysis is to find 
proxies for the time preferences at this aggregate level.  
We consider four different proxies, all of which are certainly related to 
individual time preferences, but can only capture loosely the discount rate at 
the aggregate level: (i) the consumer credit share as the ratio between the 
amount of consumer credit and the total amount of loans to households; (ii) 
the share of obese people (obesity rate); (iii) the marriage rate as the number 
of marriages per 1000 individuals; (iv) the teenage pregnancy rate as the 
share of children born from teenage mothers. All these proxies aggregate 
10 
 
choice variables at the individual level which are shown by the literature to 
be influenced by idiosyncratic time preferences (the demand of a short term 
loan, the intake of excess calories, the decision to get married, the choice of 
having unprotected sex), but are also clearly influenced by other variables 
(for instance, loan supply in the case of consumer credit). More precisely, 
considering Eq. (9), instead of having a direct measure for the empirical 
mean of the discount rates ltr , we do have empirical means of four different 
choice variables Ψ for which the (individual) discount rate plays a crucial 
role, i.e. )( ltr . We now briefly discuss each of these variables in turn. 
 
Consumer credit share. The consumer credit share is probably the most 
intuitive of such proxies for time preferences. It measures consumer credit 
standardized by the total amount of loans supplied to households. Consumer 
credit is a typical form of short-term debt, whereas total loans include, for 
instance, mortgages, that are typical long-term debts. According to the 
definition provided by the Bank of Italy in its official statistics, ‘consumer 
credit’ includes only short-term debts commonly financing the purchase of 
consumer goods, like - for instance - holidays or small appliances. At the 
individual level, the higher the discount rate - hence the lower the utility 
attached to future consumption - the higher the willingness to ask for short-
term loans to increase current consumption. Considering US data on credit 
card borrowing, Meier and Sprenger (2011a) shows that present-biased 
individuals (i.e., individuals who show a particular desire for immediate 
consumption) are indeed more indebted, hence providing evidence of a 
strong correlation between time preferences and consumer credit2. At the 
aggregate level, then, a higher share of consumer credit is informative of a 
larger share of individuals with a higher discount rate. 
                                                          
2 Unfortunately, no studies are available on Italian data. However, descriptive evidence 
taken from the 2004 Bank of Italy Survey on Household, Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
provide further support to the correlation between time preferences and consumer credit. 
See Beraldo et al. (2012) for additional details on this point  
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Of course, the (realized) share of consumer credit does not depend only on 
the time preferences of individuals. On the demand side, considering 
European data, Magri et al. (2011) show that this type of short-term debt is 
primarily used both by larger households with youngest and well educated 
heads, and by poorer households. Delinquencies (i.e., problems in repaying 
consumer credit) are more frequent among poor households, and more 
common for the unemployed relative to other positions. This means that we 
need to control – in our analysis – also for the age structure of the 
population, the share of poor households, and the unemployment rate. Yet, 
these variables are also relevant as explanatory variables for the crime 
rates. On the supply side, as the realized consumer credit share depends 
also on the credit availability at the regional level, we also augment our 
model with controls like the number of bank branches and year fixed effects, 
to account for the likely impact of the general economic situation. 
 
Obesity rate. The second proxy for time preferences is the share of obese 
people out of the total population. Following international standards, obese 
people are defined according to their Body Mass Index (i.e., BMI ≥ 30). As 
suggested for instance by Borghans and Golsteyn (2006), the link between 
BMI and the individual discount rate can be traced by considering the 
immediate gratification of eating and the future effects of over-eating, both 
in terms of physical appearance and – most importantly – in terms of 
reduced health. Again, the higher the discount rate, the lower the utility 
attached to future health, hence the higher the food intake in the current 
period, which is likely to increase BMI3. At the aggregate level, then, a 
higher share of obese people is informative of a larger share of individuals 
with a higher discount rate. 
As before for consumer credit, the available empirical evidence highlights an 
association between BMI and some measures of time preferences at the 
                                                          
3 A similar explanation has been provided about smokers. Yamane et al. (2013) show that 
smokers are more impatient than non-smokers.  
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individual level, although time preferences alone are not able to give a 
complete account of the sharp increase in the number of obese people 
observed in many countries (e.g., Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Daly et al., 
2009). Education is likely to play a role, as well as poverty, age, marital 
status, and regional cultural factors. We do then take into account also 
these additional covariates in our empirical exercise below. Notice that 
obesity has been already studied in relationship with crime, with mixed 
results. For instance, Price (2009) finds that obesity increases crime, 
whereas Kalist and Siahaan (2013) find likelihood of being arrested to be 
lower for obese people.  
 
Marriage rate. The third proxy for time preferences is the marriage rate, 
defined as the number of marriages per 1,000 individuals. Our claim is that 
time preferences may be expected to influence also the decision to get 
married; in particular, more patient individuals should be more likely to 
enter in long term relationships. Indeed, Compton (2009) discusses the 
correlation between heterogeneity in time preferences and marriage 
stability, finding some evidence to support the idea that more patient 
individuals are less likely to divorce. Grounding on this finding, we should 
expect a negative correlation between marriage rates and crime: ceteris 
paribus, the higher the discount rate, the lower the utility attached to the 
future, hence the willingness to enter long term relationships. 
However, such prediction is not unchallenged. Historical decline in marriage 
rates across industrialized countries and the change in marriage customs 
have been extensively discussed, for example, by Akerlof (1998) and 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007). In particular Akerlof (1998) also examines 
the impact of these changes on society at large, arguing that the observed 
widespread delay in settling down is likely to cause more crime and more 
substance abuses with adverse effects upon the subsequent generations, 
establishing a direct link between marriage customs and crime. Yet, this 
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implies the need to control for the share of single in our empirical analysis 
below.  
 
Teenage Pregnancy Rate. The fourth proxy for time preferences is the 
number of children per 1,000 newborn from a mother who is less than 18 
years old. Also for this proxy, there is evidence of a link with time 
preferences. For instance, Chesson et al. (2006) find that risky sexual-
behaviour-indicators (such as ‘having sex before age 16’ and ‘pregnancy 
status’) are significantly associated with high discount rates. As before, we 
then expect a positive correlation between the share of teenage mothers and 
crime: ceteris paribus, the higher the discount rate, the lower the utility 
attached to the future, hence the higher the willingness to adopt risky 
sexual behaviours. Also in this case, other variables may be responsible for 
teenage pregnancy, like the level of education or regional cultural factors. 
We account for all these in what follows. 
 
Descriptive evidence. Main descriptive statistics for all the four proxies are 
in the Appendix. Consumer credit as a share of total loans is 36 per cent 
over the five years period, and it trends upward from 35 to 39.6 per cent. 
Regional differences are also clear: the share is the highest in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno (about 47 per cent), and lowest in the North-Eastern part of the 
country (about 23 per cent). Obese are 9.9 per cent out of the whole 
population, but their share is slowly rising, from 9.2 to 10.2 per cent. 
Regional variability points to the highest share in the South (almost 11 per 
cent) and to the lowest in the North-Western area (8.5 per cent). As for the 
marriage rate, the national average is 4.17 per 1,000 people, but the trend is 
decreasing in this case, from 4.38 to 3.99 per 1,000. Also regional variation 
goes in the opposite direction with respect to the previous two proxies: the 
highest share is registered for the Mezzogiorno, while the lowest for the 
North-East (4.5 vs 3.7 per 1,000, respectively). Finally, the share of teenage 
mothers is 37 per 1,000 newborn in Italy, with a reducing trend from more 
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than 39 to about 35. As for the first two proxies, Southern regions record by 
far the highest share (56 per 1,000 newborn), while North-Western regions 
show the lowest one (22.5). To sum up, taken at face value, all but one of our 
proxies (the share of teenage pregnancy) suggest that the aggregate 
discount rate has effectively increased in Italian regions in recent years. 
Moreover, all but one of our proxies (the marriage rate) suggest that the 
Italian Mezzogiorno represents the area of the country where the aggregate 
discount rate is the highest.  
Interestingly, the four proxies are all negatively associated with the 
property crime rate and all positively associated with the violent crime rate, 
with most of the correlations that are also statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the four proxies are all positively (and significantly) 
correlated among themselves, with the strongest (linear) association 
between the marriage rate and the share of teenage pregnancy. Clearly 
enough, this suggests that – at least in some part of the country – the 
decision to get married is not only influenced by time preferences, but it 
takes shape in the presence of a unplanned pregnancy. We will account for 
cultural differences in the empirical analysis below, both by considering 
regional fixed effects and by differentiating the impact of our time 
preferences proxies across country macro-areas. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
3.3. Additional controls for crime and time preferences proxies 
As covariates, we consider a number of variables that the economic 
literature on crime deems to be important. Descriptive statistics, sources, 
and definitions of all these covariates are in the Appendix. 
We measure current economic opportunities by including lagged GDP per 
capita and two different measures of the unemployment rate, such as the 
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long-term unemployment rate and the youth unemployment rate4. GDP has 
been proved to be significantly related to crime in the Italian case (e.g., 
Caruso, 2011; Scorcu and Cellini, 1998; Marselli, 1997). However, its impact 
on crime is not perfectly predictable. On the one hand, taking income per 
capita as a measure of economic opportunities, one can expect that where 
GDP is higher, the tendency to commit crime should be lower. On the other 
hand, where GDP per capita is higher, opportunities for crime are higher 
(especially so for property crime). We also control for the share of 
immigrants out of the total population, which is correlated with - according 
to Bianchi et al. (2012) - with the incidence of property crimes.  
With regard to unemployment, some theoretical studies predict a positive 
association between crime and unemployment, as the latter is considered a 
variable reliably capturing the ‘opportunity cost’ associated to crime (e.g., 
Freeman, 1999; Ehrlich, 1996, 1973). This hypothesis has found robust 
empirical evidence for property crime (e.g., Neumayer, 2005; Levitt, 2001; 
Britt, 1997; Reilly and Witt, 1996; Allen, 1996; Chiricos, 1987; Phillips and 
Votey, 1981; Sjoquist, 1973). On the contrary there is a strand of literature 
which interprets the level of unemployment as an indicator of ‘social 
inactivity’, and posits a negative relationship between crime and 
unemployment (e.g., Cantor and Land, 1985). According to this ‘opportunity 
perspective’, as unemployed are engaged in a reduced number of social 
interactions, their ‘opportunities’ for delinquency are reduced5. Evidence is 
available only for violent crime (e.g., Cotte Poveda, 2011; Saridakis 2004; 
Levitt, 2001; Entorf and Spengler, 2000, Britt, 1997). Since unemployment 
is likely to proxy also for income distribution (e.g., Brandolini et al., 2004), a 
                                                          
4 Also for unemployment, we consider the one year lagged values of both rates, following the 
empirical strategy discussed in Allen (1996) and Levitt (2001). According to Carmichael and 
Ward (2001) and Fougère et al. (2009), youth unemployment is expected to increase crime. 
Caruso and Schneider (2011) emphasize the frustration and the political violence emerging 
in the presence of growing rates of youth unemployment. 
5 The direct role of social interactions on crime is discussed, for instance, by Glaeser et al. 
(1996) and Zenou (2003). The evidence that social interactions impact more on certain types 
of crime is consistent with the literature on the ‘opportunity perspective’. 
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further control in this direction is the relative poverty index. When 
considering the relationship between poverty and crime, we simply refer to 
the line of reasoning expounded above with respect to unemployment and 
current economic opportunities. Then, with regard to property crime we 
expect a positive correlation with crime rates whereas we may also expect a 
negative association with violent crime. The latter, in particular, is drawn 
from Mehlum et al. (2006).  
Following Caruso (2009) we also control for future economic opportunities 
captured by means of two variables: (gross) investments in manufacturing 
and patent intensity (per 1,000,000 inhabitants). We then control also for the 
number of bank branches at the regional level which is also likely to interact 
with the share of consumer credit. 
A number of studies highlight a negative correlation between education and 
crime, as education is expected to increase the returns of legitimate work 
and business, hence the opportunity costs of committing crime (e.g., Groot 
and van den Brink, 2010; Dills et al., 2008; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; 
Soares, 2004; Gould et al., 2002; Miron, 2001; Grogger, 1998). Then, we 
consider two measures for education: the share of the population between 25 
and 64 years old holding a high school diploma, and the share of the 
population between 20 and 24 years old holding a high school diploma6. In 
fact, education can also indirectly affect crime via time preferences, since it 
impacts on the ability of individuals to figure out future scenarios (e.g.,  
Borghans et al., 2008).  
Eventually, we also consider regional public expenditure in security. 
Controlling for this variable is directly suggested by the model presented in 
Section 2: the probability of being detected is clearly affected by the amount 
of resources available to the Authorities to enforce legal rules, and – in turn 
- it affects the effective discount rate of each agent (see Eq. 3 above). 
                                                          
6 Notice that the two variables capture different cohorts of individuals. For the former, 
diploma was less likely and can really be thought as a signal for patience. On the contrary, 
for the latter, diploma is much more common, and those more patient would further 
improve their education enrolling in a university course. 
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However, one of the recurring issues raised in the literature is that any 
measure of deterrence might be really co-determined with crime. This can 
explain why, in the empirical literature, different measures of deterrence 
are not statistically significant or, quite frequently, even positively related 
to crime (e.g., Benson et al., 1994a,b; Cameron, 1988; Devine et al., 1988; 
Cloninger and Sartorius, 1979; Corman et al., 1987). To mitigate the 
problem of reverse causality, we consider the one-year lagged spending in 
security. 
Another recurring question in the literature on crime is whether the age 
structure influences the level of crime. Results are not fully conclusive even 
if a positive association between younger males and violent crimes seems to 
emerge (see, among others, McCall et al., 2013; Phillips, 2006; Marvell and 
Carlisle, 1991; Steffensmeier et al, 1989). We then control for the share of 
males 15-24 years old and the share of males 25-34 years old out of the total 
population. We also control for marital status, in particular for being single, 
considering the share of single households (per 100 households), since this 
affects both the propensity to commit crimes and some of our proxies for 
time preferences (e.g., the marriage rate). Finally, we also control for ‘social 
capital’, which began to be investigated in recent literature (Akçomac and 
ter Weel, 2012; Loureiro et al.,2009; Lederman et al., 2002; Rosenfeld et al. 
2001). As for Italy, Buonanno et al. (2009) study whether social capital 
reduces crime, considering provincial level variations in associational 
networks. They find that a standard deviation increase in association 
density is related, for example, with a reduction in car thefts by 13 
percentage points. Here we sum up social capital considering another 
commonly adopted measure, namely the ratio of volunteers in not-for-profit 
organizations out of the population. Also in this case, to mitigate the reverse 
causality issue, we lagged the variable one year. We expect a negative 
correlation with crime rates. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Time preferences and crime 
We experiment with four different models for each of our proxies, entering 
all variables in logarithms. We included in all models regional and year 
fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across regions and time 
periods that cannot be captured by our covariates. We also account for serial 
and panel correlations by clustering standard errors for each region and 
each year, using the methodology proposed by Cameron et al. (2011). 
Results are in Table 2 for both property and violent crime7. For both types of 
crime we first estimated a very simple model including our proxies for time 
preferences, together with all the controls that the established literature 
indicates as important determinants of crime. We then interacted our time 
preferences proxies with macro-area dummies and a measure of resource 
distribution in each region. We are interested in coefficient  from Eq. (9); it 
captures the robust correlation between crime and our time preferences 
proxies. In the baseline model I, only the share of children born from 
teenage mothers is strongly and significantly associated with property crime 
among the proxies for time preferences. The other proxies do not appear to 
be significantly correlated with crime rates. However, according to 
descriptive statistics, there is a large variability across regions. Therefore, 
correlations could vary considerably across macro-areas. In order to capture 
such territorial asymmetries, we then introduce interactions between our 
measures of time preferences and territorial dummies.  
Introducing interactions shows more significant coefficients, although 
not all with the expected sign (model II). While coefficients for teenage 
                                                          
7 The complete tables are not included here for brevity but are available upon request from 
the authors. Notice that most coefficients of the additional controls are insignificant, likely 
because of the inclusion of time and regional fixed effects. However, when significant, 
covariates coefficients show the expected signs. In particular, significant coefficients emerge 
consistently only for the share of males 15-24 years old in the property crime equation and 
for the number of banks in the violent crime equation. 
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mothers are positive and significant in Southern regions for both types of 
crime, and coefficient for obese people in Northern regions for violent crime 
is also positive and significant as expected, results for consumer credit share 
and the marriage rate are more puzzling. In particular, the consumer credit 
share appears to be negatively associated with both violent and property 
crime in Northern regions. Albeit contrary to expectations, this result can be 
explained by the fact that Northern regions exhibit the highest income in 
Italy. And a negative association with crime in such case would likely 
capture the negative impact of current economic opportunities. To put it 
differently, as noted above, in richer regions consumer credit may also be 
expected to be a tool to facilitate consumption. This would enhance welfare 
of individuals and households so indirectly decreasing incentives to commit 
crime. Clearly opposite to expectations is also the positive and significant 
association between marriage rate and violent crime in Northern regions. 
Again, however, this result is not surprising if we consider that the 
mechanism envisioned in Akerlof (1998) may take place in richer regions. 
Moreover, since figures on violent crime include also violence between 
partners (especially against women), it is reasonable to say that family 
violence increases with the number of marriages. In this respect, Karadole 
(2012) and ISTAT (2007) had shown that in Italy violence perpetrated 
against women by husbands is higher in Northern regions.  
To capture the potential interactions between time preferences and 
economic opportunities that can affect our results, in model III we 
introduced an additional covariate interacting time preferences and the 
poverty rate.  In fact, coefficient for this interaction term with poverty comes 
up as significant and negative in three models: the impact of time 
preferences on crime is lower where the share of poor households is higher. 
Moreover, with the important exception of the share of children born from 
teenage mothers, almost all coefficients for time preferences turn to be 
insignificant. A potential explanation is that - in the presence of a high 
share of poor households - the negative effect on crime reflects much more 
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the ‘opportunity perspective’ discussed above than the role of time 
preferences. Notice, however, that time preferences still play a role also in 
this specification. First, consumer credit share coefficient is now positive (as 
expected) and significant in Southern regions for property crime. More 
importantly, almost all interactions for teenage mothers are positive and 
significant for both types of crime, with coefficient magnitude increasing 
when moving from North to South, hence counterbalancing the negative 
impact of the interaction with poverty. 
Eventually, in order to evaluate some asymmetries within Northern 
regions, we further divide these in North-Eastern and North-Western 
regions (Model IV). Results further confirm our hypotheses, with all 
significant coefficients now taking the expected sign. Moreover, coefficient 
for the interaction term between time preferences and poverty is now 
insignificant in all models, suggesting that it is the within-North variability 
the likely source of the unexpected results discussed above. In particular, for 
property crime, positive and significant coefficients now emerge for 
consumer credit share, obese people and teenage mothers in both North-
Eastern and Southern regions, while a negative and significant association 
emerge for the marriage rate in North-Western regions. As for violent crime, 
a positive and significant association still emerge in both North-Eastern and 
Southern regions for teenage mothers again. 
 
 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 From crime to time preferences? 
In the previous section we analysed the relationship between crime and 
time preferences by hypothesizing that time preferences may significantly 
be associated with crime rates. However, a growing literature explains the 
formation of time preferences in the light of some specific violent and risky 
events. In particular, Chao et al. (2009) show that mortality risk is a crucial 
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determinant of time preferences in a country, South-Africa, where the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS is high. Along this line, Lahav et al. (2011) and 
Shavit et al. (2013) analyse in depth time preferences of soldiers in Israel. 
Soldiers face a high mortality risk as compared to university students and 
teenagers. In fact, the authors show that - among these categories of young 
adults - soldiers show the highest discount rates, concluding that a violent 
and risky environment affect time preferences. 
With this in mind, therefore, while studying the relationship between crime 
and time preferences it could be maintained that exposure to crime and 
other risks make individuals more impatient. To test whether or not this is 
valid also in our aggregate framework, we estimate a model where the one 
year lagged crime rates are both used as regressors – together with all the 
other covariates discussed before – in a model for time preferences proxies. 
Results are in Table 3.8 Coefficients for these variables are never significant, 
suggesting that there seems to be no evidence for an impact of a violent 
environment on time preferences proxies at this aggregate level. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
In this paper we proposed an empirical test on the relationship at the 
aggregate level between time preferences and crime considering Italian 
regions observed over the period 2003-2007. The theoretical hypothesis is 
drawn by Davis (1988) and can be summarised as follows: individuals who 
discount the future more heavily may be more prone to commit crimes. As a 
consequence, where people are more impatient and discount the future more 
                                                          
8 Also in this case the complete tables are available upon requests from the authors. 
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heavily, property and violent crimes are supposed to be higher. We test this 
hypothesis by considering both property and violent crimes. We proxy time 
preferences at the aggregate level using four very different proxies, all of 
which are choice variables affected at the individual level by idiosyncratic 
discount rates: 1) the consumer credit share, which is the amount of short-
term debt to finance current consumption; 2) the prevalence of obese people 
according to their body mass index, which is related to the consideration of 
future health; 3) the marriage rate, interpreted as the willingness of 
individuals to engage in stable and long-term relationships; 4) the share of 
children born from teenage mothers, which tells about the preference for 
unprotected sexual adult experiences.  
Controlling for variables drawn from the established literature on crime, as 
well as considering time and regional fixed effects, besides serial and panel 
correlations, our results basically provide support to the Davis hypothesis, 
at least for property crime, while they are not fully conclusive for violent 
crime. In particular, for property crime, we find a positive and significant 
correlation between criminal behaviour and consumer credit share, obese 
people and teenage mothers in both North-Eastern and Southern regions, 
while a negative and significant association emerge for the marriage rate in 
North-Western regions. As for violent crime, a positive and significant 
association still emerge in both North-Eastern and Southern regions for 
teenage mothers only. Moreover, following a line of research emphasizing 
the role of violence in influencing individual discount rates, we also check 
whether a violent environment influences time preferences, but find no 
evidence at this aggregate level.  
Needless to say, we are aware that this work has several limitations, which 
are related to the nature and the number of observations, the time length 
and – more importantly – the (aggregate) proxies of time preferences. 
Extending the work to address these points would be part of a new research 
agenda on these issues. Still, some implications can be drawn from our 
results. In fact, if time preferences are associated with crime rates, 
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evidently it becomes important to understand how these preferences are 
shaped. Some scholars suggest that time preferences depend upon cognitive 
(unobserved) abilities and/or other biological characteristics. Dohmen et al. 
(2010) suggest for example that cognitive ability and impatience are 
negatively correlated. One may therefore think that individuals with 
reduced cognitive ability are more prone to commit crime. Daly et al. (2009) 
find that discount rates correlate positively with systolic blood pressure. 
Supporters of this vision would advocate that hypertensive individuals are 
more prone – ceteris paribus - to engage in antisocial activities. In general, 
these ideas are not new and would imply that the propensity to commit 
crime would be biologically determined, an hypothesis very close to the one 
first advanced by the Italian anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, and 
eventually rejected on scientific grounds. 
An alternative hypothesis is that time preferences are socially 
determined. In other words, they are mostly determined by social processes 
related to the cultural transmission of values and norms. In this sense, our 
analysis at a regional level might properly catch the ‘average’ time 
preferences in a given social context. How society influences time 
preferences is then a key challenge for future research, and the crucial 
question really becomes how time preferences can be influenced (or not) by 
means of adequate policies. Empirical results discussed here suggest that 
policies contributing to give more importance to the future are likely to be 
important. In this sense, policies emphasizing the importance of saving, of 
future health, of stable relationships, are likely to go in the right direction to 
bring back the sense of future, to challenge the ‘life-is-now’ perspective, and 
to improve social life via the association with criminal behaviour. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Correlations 
 
      
 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Consumer 
credit 
share 
Marriage 
rate 
Obesity 
rate 
Teenage 
Pregnancy 
rate 
       
Property crime 1.000 
     
       
Violent crime .3669*** 1.000 
    
 
(.000) 
     
Consumer credit share -.4922*** .1964** 1.000 
   
 
(.000) (.050) 
    
Marriage rate -.1053 .3428*** .5143*** 1.000 
  
 
(.297) (.000) (.000) 
   
Obesity -.4457*** .0596 .4865*** .2099** 1.000 
 
 
(.000) (.556) (.000) (.036) 
  
Teenage Pregnancy rate -.2008** .3238*** .4827*** .6372*** .2932 1.000 
 
(.045) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.003) 
 P-values in parentheses. Sig. Lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. Time preferences and crime 
  
Dep. Var.: Property Crime 
 
Dep. Var.: Violent Crime 
Regressors   
  
Consumer 
Credit Share 
Obesit
y rate  
Marriag
e rate 
Teenage 
pregnancy 
rate   
Consumer 
Credit Share 
Obesit
y rate  
Marriag
e rate 
Teenage 
pregnancy 
rate 
Model I                   
Time preferences -0.189 0.069 0.235 0.095*** 
 
-0.149 -0.138 0.279 0.102 
 
(0.142) (0.106) (0.432) (0.030) 
 
(0.187) (0.197) (0.654) (0.138) 
          
Model II                   
Time pref x 
Northern Italy -0.368*** 0.412 0.152 0.121 
 
-0.362* 0.502* 1.211* -0.013 
 
(0.133) (0.351) (0.700) (0.080) 
 
(0.201) (0.279) (0.674) (0.160) 
Time pref x 
Centeral Italy -0.065 -0.117 -0.179 0.025 
 
-0.075 -0.342 -0.791 0.048 
 
(0.194) (0.135) (0.384) (0.065) 
 
(0.160) (0.287) (0.573) (0.219) 
Time pref x 
Southern Italy 0.379 0.023 0.451 0.115* 
 
0.806 -0.319 0.265 0.212* 
 
(0.264) (0.260) (0.497) (0.061) 
 
(0.656) (0.226) (0.525) (0.120) 
          
Model III                   
Time pref x 
Northern Italy -0.143 0.592 0.821 0.507** 
 
-0.253 0.396 2.409 0.579** 
 
(0.169) (0.423) (1.033) (0.255) 
 
(0.276) (1.186) (1.734) (0.235) 
Time pref x Central 
Italy 0.197 0.084 0.528 0.418 
 
0.051 -0.460 0.472 0.650** 
 
(0.222) (0.471) (0.928) (0.265) 
 
(0.335) (1.327) (1.399) (0.316) 
Time pref x 
Southern Italy 0.879** 0.322 1.477 0.733*** 
 
1.047 -0.494 2.102 1.159*** 
 
(0.415) (0.584) (1.453) (0.279) 
 
(0.737) (1.783) (2.220) (0.383) 
Time pref x Poverty -0.121* -0.100 -0.349 -0.199* 
 
-0.058 0.059 -0.624 -0.305*** 
 
(0.071) (0.206) (0.473) (0.107) 
 
(0.123) (0.617) (0.782) (0.114) 
          
Model IV                   
Time pref x North 
Western regions 0.122 0.569 -1.530** 0.498 
 
-0.028 0.449 2.174 0.451 
 
(0.310) (0.453) (0.694) (0.352) 
 
(0.210) (1.166) (1.809) (0.351) 
Time pref x North-
Eastern regions -0.263 0.797* 0.916 0.513** 
 
-0.355 -0.071 2.418 0.664*** 
 
(0.284) (0.421) (0.842) (0.234) 
 
(0.218) (1.164) (1.703) (0.253) 
Time pref x Central 
Italy 0.124 0.124 0.130 0.413 
 
-0.010 -0.550 0.433 0.581 
 
(0.268) (0.401) (0.684) (0.322) 
 
(0.339) (1.338) (1.439) (0.364) 
Time pref x 
Southern Italy 0.850** 0.350 0.925 0.724* 
 
1.023 -0.558 2.047 1.034* 
 
(0.386) (0.555) (1.184) (0.380) 
 
(0.726) (1.750) (2.176) (0.548) 
Time pref x Poverty -0.104 -0.110 -0.185 -0.196 
 
-0.044 0.080 -0.607 -0.265 
 
(0.074) (0.188) (0.420) (0.139) 
 
(0.130) (0.615) (0.780) (0.162) 
                    
Two-ways Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. Sig. Lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls included in all models: lagged GDP per capita, long term unemployment, youth unemployment, investment in manufacturing, 
patents, education, lagged spending for security, volunteers, foreigners, poor households, male 15-24 yrs. old, male 25-34 yrs. old, single 
households, regional and year Fixed Effects  
 
33 
 
Table 3. From crime to time preferences 
  Dep. Var. (time preferences) 
Regressors Consumer Credit Share Obesity rate  Marriage rate Teenage pregnancy rate 
          
Lagged Property Crime (t-1) -0.097 -0.006 0.109 0.610 
 
(0.102) (0.189) (0.092) (0.539) 
Lagged Violent Crime (t-1) -0.005 -0.069 0.099 0.050 
 
(0.148) (0.203) (0.086) (0.541) 
Two-ways Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses. Sig. Lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls included in all models: lagged GDP per capita, long term unemployment, youth unemployment, investment in 
manufacturing, patents, education, lagged spending for security, volunteers, foreigners, poor households, male 15-24 yrs. 
old, male 25-34 yrs. old, single households, regional and year Fixed Effects 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Variables definitions and descriptive statistics 
  Definition  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Property Crime rate* Number of property crime ( thefts, robberies and burglaries.) per 1,000 inhabitants 21.970 8.350 6.15 40.43 
Violent Crime rate* Number of violent crime (rapes, homicides, kidnappings, injuries and lesions)per  10,000 of inhabitants. 16.025 5.939 6.2 40.1 
Consumer Credit Share** Ratio between the amount of consumer credit and the total amount of loans to households. .365 .104 .14 .59 
Obesity rate* Share of obese people out of the total population (Body Mass Index ≥ 30) 9.901 1.410 6.57 13.24 
Marriage rate* Number of marriages per 1.000 individuals 4.171 .541 3.2 5.76 
Teenage pregnancy rate* Share of children born from teenage mothers 37.074 27.035 7.921 131.408 
Youth Unemployment (t-1)* Proportion of the youth labour force (persons aged between 15-24) that is unemployed.  22.483 11.962 7.2 46.5 
Long- term Unemployment (t-1)* Proportion of labor force out of work and looking for work for 12 months or more 42.122 13. 418 11.9 61.9 
Poverty* Relative Poverty Index 12.308 8.403 2.5 30.8 
Foreigners* Share of immigrants out of the total population 3.581 2.095 .596 7.595 
High School (20-24)* Ratio of individuals holding a high school diploma aged 20-24 out of total population 75.333 6.162 56.7 84.4 
High School (25-64)* Ratio of individuals holding a high school diploma aged 25-64 out of total population 49.983 5.752 37.4 61.4 
Male 15-24* Share of males, 15-24 years old out of the total population 5.315 .928 3.890 7.075 
Male 25-34* Share of males, 25-34 years old out of the total population 7.209 .424 5.618 8.106 
Single* Share of single households (per 100 households) 13.665 2.585 9.633 16.9 
GDP per capita (t-1) * Gross Domestic Product per capita (1,000 euro) 23.791 5.877 14.773 34.531 
Investments in Manufacturing (t-1)*  Gross Investments in Manufacturing  2692.876 3229.187 46.22 14708.09 
Patent Intensity (t-1) Patents registered at EPO per 1,000,000 inhabitants 59.896 52.591 .3 187.4 
Banks** Number of bank branches 1571.868 1420.056 96 6344 
Social Capital (t-1)* Ratio of volunteers out of the total population 1.808 1.832 .415 9.451 
Security*(t-1) Public expenditure in security  1222.729 970.554 65.82 3889.07 
Sources: * Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT); ** Bank of Italy.  
 
